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INTRODUCTION

Recent Congressional proposals suggest budding bipartisan
support for enacting a patent box.2 A patent box3 is a regulatory regime
granting tax relief for commercial activity related to qualifying research
and development (R&D), patents, or other intellectual property (IP).4
Tax relief is often provided to firms5 through a deduction, a reduced
rate, or an exemption of IP income.6 Congressmen Boustany’s (R-LA)
and Neal’s (D-MA) patent box proposal allows corporations to deduct
71% of qualified profits, producing an effective 10% tax rate.7
Meanwhile, Senator Feinstein’s (D-CA) proposal seeks a 15% tax rate
on income from patents developed and used for manufacture in the

2

JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10289, A U.S. PATENT BOX: ISSUES
(2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10289.pdf (“Congressional proposals for the
subsidy (known as a patent or innovation box) include a draft proposal by
Representatives Boustany and Neal, the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015, proposed
legislation by Senator Feinstein, and a bill introduced by Representative Schwartz in the
113th Congress (H.R. 2605).”); Evan Migdail & Bruce Thompson, Patent box concept
emerges on the tax reform agenda for U.S. Congress, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (May 5,
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/patent-box-concept-emerges-on-the-tax27232/ (“In recent weeks, a major concept has emerged in tax reform discussions: the
establishment of a patent or innovation box.”).
3
Depending on the types of intellectual property covered, it is also known as an
innovation box. See Bernard Knight & Goud Maragani, It Is Time for the United States to
Implement a Patent Box Tax Regime to Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 52 (2013). Ireland implemented the first patent box in 1973, and the
UK, France, and China, among others, have done so in recent years. GRAVELLE, supra
note 2; ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT ANDES, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
FOUND., PATENT BOXES: INNOVATION IN TAX POLICY AND TAX POLICY FOR
INNOVATION 15 (2011), http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-box-final.pdf.
4
Jim Shanahan, Is it time for your Country to consider the “patent box”?, PWC’S
GLOBAL R&D TAX SYMPOSIUM ON DESIGNING A BLUEPRINT FOR REDUCING THE AFTERTAX COST OF GLOBAL R&D 4 (2011),
http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011_is_it_time_for_your_country_to_
consider_the_patent_box.pdf; ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3.
5
Per Bylund, The Economic Theory of the Firm, MISES DAILY (Sep. 20, 2011),
https://mises.org/library/economic-theory-firm.
6
Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
347, 363 (2013).
7
JASON J. FICHTNER & ADAM N. MICHEL, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON
UNIV., DON’T PUT AMERICAN INNOVATION IN A PATENT BOX: TAX POLICY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF R&D, MERCATUS ON POLICY 2–3
(2015), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Fichtner-Patent-Boxes-MOP.pdf;
GRAVELLE, supra note 2.

251

PATENT BOX PROPOSALS

[7:249 2016]

US.8 Although regimes vary,9 nations typically deploy patent boxes to
address certain market failures hindering innovation.10 In particular,
patent boxes have been adopted abroad as a back-end incentive to
foster R&D commercialization and spending by domestic firms.11
Despite widespread adoption, patent boxes remain
controversial.12 Proponents cite potential domestic manufacturing gains
and incentive effects.13 Skeptics and opponents, on the other hand, raise
redundancy and efficacy concerns.14 Before expending political capital
to adopt a patent box, its impact as a potential U.S. policy instrument
should be considered.
Assessing the efficacy of a patent box elsewhere may inform
the U.S. impact analysis. The U.K. recently enacted a patent box in
2013 and shares enough economic similarities to provide a useful
comparison to the U.S.15 A mere country-to-country comparison,
however, fails to consider the broader, interactive factors that
contribute to a country’s innovation performance.16 A policy mix
approach offers a conceptual framework for understanding the
8

GRAVELLE, supra note 2.
See Shanahan, supra note 4, at 4. See also Knight & Maragani, supra note 3, at 48.
10
Innovation refers to the “transformation of ideas into new products, services, or
improvements in organization or process.” RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: U.S.
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 24 (Charles W. Wessner & Alan Wm.
Wolff, eds., Nat’l Academies Press 2012), http://politiques-innovation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/2012-Wessner-STEP-Rising-to-the-Challenge-U.S.-InnovationPolicy-for-Global-Economy.pdf. Accordingly, “[s]ome innovations are incremental;
others are disruptive, displacing exiting technologies while creating new markets and
value networks.” Id. ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 15–16; see infra Section III.
11
ROBERT D. ATKINSON & STEPHEN J. EZELL, INNOVATION ECONOMICS: THE RACE FOR
A GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 172 (2012); see GLOBAL TAX ACCOUNTING SERVICES,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT BOX AND TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVES: TAX AND
FINANCIAL REPORTING CONSIDERATIONS 1–2 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/
publications/assets/pwc-patent-box-and-technology-incentives-tax-and-financialreporting-considerations.pdf; see also Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 362 (“A
substantial number of European countries have recently implemented innovation tax
incentives that focus on the income, rather than the development, side of IP by adopting
‘patent boxes,’ or ‘innovation boxes.’”).
12
Simon Goodley, George Osborne waters down flagship controversial tax break, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2014, 1:07 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/11/george-osborne-patent-boxes-taxbreak.
13
See, e.g., Knight & Margani, supra note 3, at 42–46.
14
ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 1, 9–14.
15
ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 15.
16
See infra Section III.
9
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interdependence of actors, ideas, structures, institutions, and policies
integral to a country’s innovation performance. Evaluating the impact
of the U.K. patent box in this framework will overcome the pitfalls of a
direct comparison.17
Therefore, to gauge the value of adopting a patent box, this
paper first establishes the importance of innovation policy within the
increasingly competitive nature of the global economy.18 It then
assesses the U.K. and U.S. policy instruments deployed to foster
innovation: the patent box and the R&D tax credit, respectively.19 With
an understanding of these two exemplary policy instruments, a broader
policy mix framework is then developed to provide a conceptual
underpinning for evaluating the efficacy of the patent box and the
innovation ecology of both countries.20 This paper then, based on the
comparison and policy mix framework, argues that the patent box
provides little benefit beyond that of already implemented policy
tools.21 Finally, a more comprehensive and directed approach to
innovation, rather than the incremental one used thus far, is
recommended to ensure that the U.S. remains competitive in the global
economy.22
II.

U.K. AND U.S. INNOVATION POLICY IN A COMPETITIVE
GLOBAL ECONOMY

A. Global Competition to Foster Innovation
It is widely accepted by economists and nations alike that
innovation drives economic prosperity.23 It is also well established that
private sector R&D is “crucial to ongoing technological advances,” is
17

See infra Section IV.
See infra Section II.A.
19
See infra Section II.B.
20
See infra Section III.
21
See infra Section IV.
22
See infra Section IV.
23
Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 348 (“Two things are clear and essentially uncontested
among economists. First is the importance of technological innovations to economic
growth.”); ATKINSON & EZELL supra note 11, at 6 (“[M]ost nations recognize that they
have to be intense competitors if they are to be successful . . . . And most nations also
realize that high wage innovation and knowledge-based industries play a key role in
driving prosperity.”); RISING TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 10, at 201 (“Virtually every
important trading partner has declared innovation to be central to increasing productivity,
economic growth, and living standards.”).
18
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capable of producing positive externalities, and “is underproduced in
the absence of government support.”24 This, combined with the
growing mobility of firms, has created an environment where countries
look to reel in firms with beneficial policies.25 Fierce competition has
thus arisen between nations to develop innovation policies that attract
firms willing to invest in R&D and increase commercialization by
domestic firms:26 “Nations around the world are establishing national
innovation strategies, restructuring their tax and regulatory systems to
become more competitive, expanding support for science and
technology, improving their education systems, spurring investment in
broadband and other IT areas, and taking a myriad of other proinnovation steps.”27
A nation hoping to compete in this environment must make
innovation a focal point of its economic development.28 Failure to
acknowledge and adapt to the increasingly competitive international
innovation arena could spell future economic trouble.29
The U.S. once stood at the forefront of innovation policy in
the 1970s but has since fallen.30 Although it now spends more on R&D
than any other nation, “its relative position (measured by the share of
such investment in national income) has been falling even as other
countries increase their investments in research.”31 This decline will
become increasingly problematic as the U.S. economy relies more and
24

Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 349; see Laura Tyson & Greg Linden, The Corporate
R&D Tax Credit and U.S. Innovation and Competitiveness: Gauging the Economic and
Fiscal Effectiveness of the Credit, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (2012),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2012/01/pdf/corporate_r_and_d.pdf
25
See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 15.
26
RISING TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 10, at 201 (“The twenty-first century is
witnessing a rapidly evolving, intensely competitive global landscape. Political and
business leaders in both advanced and emerging economies see innovation-led
development as central to growth. China, India, Russia, Germany, and Singapore are
among the many nations that are formulating comprehensive national strategies for
improving their innovation capacity.”); see ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 20 n.1
(quoting Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller & Martin O’Connell, “Corporate Taxes and the
Location of Intellectual Property” (June 2011) (working paper) (Center for Economic
Policy Research).
27
3ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 11, at 6.
28
Id. at 8.
29
Cf. id., at 9–10 (arguing that rapid industrial decline is related to a lack of challenging
the status quo thinking regarding innovation–supporting policies).
30
See id., at 6.
31
TYSON & LINDEN, supra note 24, at 1.
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more on innovation and IP.32 To stem this decline, the U.S. must
reassess its innovation policy.33
B. Comparing U.K. and U.S. Innovation Policy
U.K. innovation policy and its effects serve as a useful
counterpoint to those of the U.S., providing the comparative utility of a
patent box and illustrative economic factors. Both, for example, are
world-leaders in research34 and have top-notch universities, each an
important element in sustaining innovation. A key distinction, however,
lies in the U.K.’s comparatively low rate of business innovation.35
From 2000 to 2013, the U.K.’s business R&D intensity36 ranked well
below the average of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries.37 The U.S., on the other hand, ranked
above the OECD average during the period from 2000 to 2012.38 These
distinctions will prove useful in assessing the potential efficacy of the
patent box in the U.S.39

32

See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 17.
See id.
34
See OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (2011), http://www.oecdilibrary.org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2011en/02/05/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/sti_scoreboard-2011-16-en (last visited
May 14, 2016); Peter Coy, The Bloomberg Innovation Index, BLOOMBERG (2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-innovative-countries/.
35
See THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DIRECTORATE FOR SCI., TECH.
AND INNOVATION, R&D TAX INCENTIVE SUPPORT: UNITED KINGDOM (2016),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-STI-RDTaxIncentives-CountryProfile_GBR.pdf; THE
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DIRECTORATE FOR SCI., TECH. AND
INNOVATION, R&D TAX INCENTIVE SUPPORT: UNITED STATES (2016),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-STI-RDTaxIncentives-CountryProfile_USA.pdf.
36
R&D intensity is a measure of an “economy’s relative degree of investment in
generating new knowledge” and is calculated as the gross domestic expenditure on R&D
as a percentage of GDP. OECD, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard
(2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2011en/02/05/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/sti_scoreboard-2011-16-en (last visited
May 14, 2016).
37
Id.
38
OECD, R&D TAX INCENTIVE SUPPORT: UNITED STATES,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-STI-RDTaxIncentives-CountryProfile_USA.pdf (last
visited May 14, 2016).
39
See infra Section IV.
33
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Innovation Policy in the UK

“The U.K. has made a conscientious decision to place
innovation at the center of our nation’s economic growth strategy”40 by
deploying, among other things, R&D tax incentives and tax advantaged
venture capital schemes as innovation policy instruments.41 Most
relevant here, however, is its recent adoption of the patent box.
a.

History of the U.K. Patent Box

Responding to a growing number of companies moving patent
holdings offshore, the government in 2010 announced its intent to
introduce a patent box as part of a larger plan to develop a more
competitive tax system for businesses.42 In particular, the goal was to
provide incentives for companies to retain and commercialize existing
patents and to develop new patented products:43 “The Patent Box will
encourage companies to locate the high-value jobs and activity
associated with the development, manufacture and exploitation of
patents in the UK. It will also enhance the competitiveness of the UK
tax system for high-tech companies that obtain profits from patents.”44
The patent box was developed, in part, over the course of three
consultations.45 With each consultation, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HM
Treasury), the economic and finance ministry of the U.K.

40

ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 11, at 135.
DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, OUR PLAN FOR GROWTH: SCIENCE
AND INNOVATION (2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387780/P
U1719_HMT_Science_.pdf.
42
HM TREASURY, CONSULTATION ON THE PATENT BOX 3 (2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81512/con
sult_patent_box.pdf.
43
CIRD200110 Patent Box: overview of the patent box regime: aim of the patent box,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/Manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD200110.htm (last visited May 14,
2016).
44
HM TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: DELIVERING A MORE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM
47 (2010),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81303/cor
porate_tax_reform_complete_document.pdf.
45
HM TREASURY, PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES 3 (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/469969/Pa
tent_Box_substantial_activities.pdf.
41
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government,46 hoped to engage “businesses, representative bodies and
others interested in the [sic] promoting the growth of innovative
companies in the U.K. will play a full part in the consultation
process.”47 Shortly after these consultations, the Finance Act of 2012
enacted the current patent box into law.48
Recent developments, however, promise forthcoming changes
to the patent box.49 On October 22, 2015, HM Treasury released a
consultation discussing options for modifying the patent box in view of
OECD recommendations predicated on curbing base erosion and profit
shifting by multinational enterprises.50 The U.K.’s new approach to the
patent box will be that of a modified nexus approach.51 Future
legislation will likely “introduce a requirement that, in order to benefit
from the regime, a business must conduct the substantial activities
which generate the income benefiting from the regime.”52 The changes
aligned with the OECD recommendations will apply to new entrants on
July 1, 2016.53
b.

Design of the U.K. Patent Box

The current U.K. patent box, as yet unchanged by the OECD
recommendations, applies a 10% lower rate of corporate tax to profits
attributable to patents and equivalent forms of IP, whether received as a

46

HM Treasury, About us, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hmtreasury/about (last visited May 14, 2016) (“HM Treasury is the government’s economic
and finance ministry, maintaining control over public spending, setting the direction of
the U.K.’s economic policy and working to achieve strong and sustainable economic
growth.”).
47
CONSULTATION ON THE PATENT BOX, supra note 42.
48
CIRD200120 Patent Box: overview of the patent box regime: history of the patent box,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/Manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD200120.htm (last visited May 14,
2016); see Finance Act 2012, sch. 2, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/14/pdfs/ukpga_20120014_en.pdf (last visited
May 14, 2016); see also PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 7.
49
See PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 10.
50
See id. at 1; Simmons & Simmons, U.K. consultation on patent box changes, ELIXICA
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/tax/30-uk-consultation-onpatent-box-changes.
51
Simmons & Simmons, supra note 50.
52
Id.
53
Id.
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royalty or embedded in the sales price of a product.54 The lower rate is
achieved through an equivalent deduction based on relevant profits.55
The deduction can be calculated according to the following formula:
RP × FY% × ((MR - IPR) ÷ MR)
where RP is the profits of a company’s trade relevant to patent box;
FY% is the appropriate percentage for each financial year; MR is the
main rate of Corporation Tax; and IPR is the reduced rate of 10%.56
Qualifying companies can elect to receive this benefit.57
In order to qualify, a company must satisfy one of three
conditions: condition A, B, or C.58 A company fulfills condition A if it
holds qualifying IP rights or an exclusive license in qualifying IP
rights.59 Condition B is met if a company has held a ‘qualifying IP
right’ or an exclusive license in respect of any qualifying IP rights, has
received income in respect of an event or events occurring at times
when it was a qualifying company and a patent box election had effect,
and that income falls to be taxed in a later accounting period.60 Lastly,
condition C can be met only by members of a group and requires a
company to have either developed or be actively managing its IP
portfolio.61 Qualifying IP includes patents granted under the U.K.
Patents Act of 1977 and under the European Patent Convention.62

54

HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, CORPORATION TAX: THE PATENT BOX (Jan. 1, 2007)
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-the-patent-box; see also PATENT BOX:
SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 7.; CIRD200120, supra note 48.
55
PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 7.
56
CORPORATION TAX: THE PATENT BOX, supra note 54.
57
DLA Piper, The UK Patent Box: Plan Now For 2013 and Beyond 1 (2012),
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2012/07/The%20UK%20p
atent%20box/Files/UK_Patent_Box/FileAttachment/UK_Patent_Box.pdf (last visited
May 14, 2016).
58
CIRD210100 Patent Box: qualifying companies: meaning of ‘qualifying company,’
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD210100.htm (last visited May 14,
2016).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
DLA Piper, supra note 57, at 2.
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Efficacy of the U.K. Patent Box

It may be too early to assess the true impact of the U.K. patent
box.63 One way to determine the effectiveness of the patent box would
require data showing the extent to which it accomplished its aims.64 A
proper evaluation would thus require evidence showing the extent to
which the tax regime incentivized companies to retain and
commercialize existing patents or develop newly patented products at
the margins.65 It would also consider evidence tending to show the
movement of high-value jobs into the U.K. to exploit the tax regime.66
This, weighed against the loss of tax revenue resulting from these tax
breaks would provide an idea of the measure’s efficacy.67
Some emerging evidence may bear on this balance, but the
overall outlook remains unclear. According to HM Treasury, “[t]he
introduction of the Patent Box has encouraged investment and
economic growth in the U.K. as well as limiting the movement of
intellectual property offshore by innovative businesses that might
otherwise have invested elsewhere.”68 As of October 22, 2015, 639
companies using the patent box had received a benefit having an
aggregate total of £335 million.69 Further dissection of this statistic,
however, would be necessary to understand how it captures the
commercialization of patents for companies that would not have
otherwise done so. Additionally, GlaxoSmithKline, a pharmaceutical
63

See CAMBRIDGE DESIGN PARTNERSHIP AND MARKS & CLERK, An Industry Report on
the Patent Box Initiative and its Impact on UK Innovation, Patent Box: Incentivizing UK
Innovation 6 (2013), http://www.marksclerk.com/MarksClerk/media/MCMediaLib/PDF's/Reports/Marks-Clerk-Patent-BoxReport-2013.pdf?ext=.pdf (last visited May 14, 2016).
64
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Reducing the
Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance 7 (2000),
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/1910833.pdf (“A key determinant of
government effectiveness is how well regulatory systems achieve their policy
objectives.”). See also supra Section II.B.a.
65
See CHARLES LEVY & LAURA O’BRIEN, Will the Patent Box Boost the U.K. Innovation
Ecosystem?, BIG INNOVATION CENTRE 7 (2013)
https://fvstatic.s3.amazonaws.com/1425647105_0329808001425647105.pdf.
66
See supra Section II.B.2.a.
67
A similar balancing analysis would be needed to test the impact of the R&D tax credit.
See, e.g,. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31191, RESEARCH TAX
CREDIT: CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS 8 (2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31181.pdf; see also supra Section II.B.2.c.
68
PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 24.
69
Id. at 5.
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company ranked the 135th largest in the world as of 2015,70 stated an
intention to relocate R&D operations into the U.K. to take advantage of
the patent box.71 Though promising, it is unclear the extent to which
this may be indicative of other companies following suit. Lastly,
another potential efficacy metric, arguably in alignment with stated
objectives,72 might be the extent to which patent filings have increased
after or in anticipation of the tax regime’s implementation.73 Patent
application filings in the U.K. totaled 22,256 in 2011; 23,229 in 2012;
22,936 in 2013; and 23,040 in 2014.74 Patent publications totaled
10,043 in 2011; 10,653 in 2012; 11,021 in 2013; and 12,227 in 2014.75
Based on the data thus far, there is no clear indication that the patent
box has affected filings. In light of all presented data, further evidence
is needed to assess the efficacy of the U.K. patent box.
2.

Innovation Policy in the US

In contrast to the U.K. patent box, U.S. federal law provides
two tax incentives for firm R&D investment, both of which were
enacted to overcome market failures.76 Section 174 of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) offers an unlimited expensing allowance for
qualified research spending, while Section 41 of the IRC offers a non70

The World’s Biggest Public Companies, FORBES.COM,
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/3/#tab:overall (last visited May 14, 2016).
71
Bob Stembridge, Patent Box Tax Incentives Show Positive Signs, THOMPSON REUTERS,
http://stateofinnovation.thomsonreuters.com/patent-box-tax-incentives-show-positivesigns (last visited May 14, 2016) (“GlaxoSmithKline is on record as taking advantage of
the U.K. Patent Box by relocating some of its R&D operations back to the U.K. from
offshore locations. Chief Executive Andrew Witty said recently, ‘Since the Patent Box,
we’ve invested in upgrading 15 or 16 of our sites in the UK. It has made Britain the go-to
place for our industry.’”).
72
See supra Section II.B.1.
73
See CAMBRIDGE DESIGN PARTNERSHIP AND MARKS & CLERK, supra note 63, at 3
(comparing patent application numbers between countries that have enacted Patent Box
schemes to those that have not).
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INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, Facts and figures: Patent, trade mark, design & hearing
administrative data 2013 and 2014 calendar years 5 (June 2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/456097/Fa
cts_and_Figures_2015.pdf.
75
Id.
76
See Gary Guenther, Research Tax Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 114th
Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL31191 at 2 (March 13, 2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31181.pdf; W. Wesley Hill & J. Sims Rhyne,
Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: Global Intellectual Property Tax Incentives and Their
Implication for the United States, 53 IDEA 371, 377 (2013).
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refundable tax credit for qualified research spending above a base
amount (“the R&D credit”).77 The former, enacted in 1954,78 allows a
taxpayer “to deduct currently all ‘research and experimental
expenditures’ made in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business
or to amortize the expenditures over a period of not less than 60
months.”79 The latter, and the focus of this section, provides an income
tax credit for qualified R&D expenditures.80
a.

History of the U.S. R&D Tax Credit

Responding to the decline in research and development
expenditures relative to the real gross national product from 1968 to
1979,81 Congress established a temporary research tax credit in Section
41 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (“ERTA”).82 Section 41
of the ERTA provided a tax credit to firms “equal to 25% of qualified
research spending above a base amount, which was equal to average
spending on such research in the three previous tax years, or 50% of
current-year spending, whichever was greater.”83 Since its inception,
the R&D credit has been modified and extended numerous times.84 In
77

Guenther, supra note 76, at 2; see 26 U.S.C. § 174 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
Guenther, supra note 76, at 2.
79
David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit: Statutory Construction, Regulatory
Interpretation and Policy Incoherence, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 63, 72 (2004); Hill &
Rhyne, supra note 76, at 376.
80
Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 353.
81
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., General Explanation of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) (“In the case of research and
development activities conducted by business, company-financed and Federal
expenditures over the 12-year period 1968-1979 remained at a fairly stable level in real
terms, fluctuating between $19 and $22.8 billion in constant dollars. Relative to real gross
national product, such expenditures for company research declined from 2.01 percent in
1968 to 1.58 percent in 1975, essentially remaining at that level since then.”).
82
Id. at 120 (“In order to reverse this decline in research spending by industry, the
Congress concluded that a substantial tax credit for incremental research and
experimental expenditures was needed to overcome the reluctance of many ongoing
companies to bear the significant costs of staffing and supplies, and certain equipment
expenses such as computer charges, which must be incurred to initiate or expand research
programs in a trade or business.”). See Hill & Rhyne, supra note 76, at 377; Graetz &
Doud, supra note 6, at 352.
83
Guenther, supra note 76, at 11.
84
Tyson & Linden, supra note 24, at 7 (“Since then [1981], the credit has been
restructured several times and renewed 13 times. With a single 12-month exception in
1995–1996 (during which the credit ceased to be in effect), each extension has continued
from the previous date of expiration.”); Guenther, supra note 76, at 11.
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the first such alteration, Congress revised the research tax credit in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and extended the credit until December 31,
1988.85 Other noteworthy modifications occurred in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 raised the base
amount so that it was equal to the greater of 50% of a firm’s currentyear qualified research expenditures, or the product of the firm’s
average annual gross receipts in the previous four tax years and a
“fixed-base percentage.”86 The Energy Policy Act “added a fourth
component to the research tax credit by establishing a credit equal to
20% of payments for energy research performed under contract by
qualified research consortia, colleges and universities, federal
laboratories, and eligible small firms.”87 Now, with the passage of the
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, the R&D tax credit
been extended indefinitely.88
b.

Design of the U.S. R&D Tax Credit

In an effort spanning decades, the U.S. has developed a
quadripartite R&D credit, comprising: (1) a regular research credit, (2)
an alternative simplified credit, (3) a basic research credit, and (4) an
energy research credit.89 The regular research credit equals the sum of
20% of a company’s qualified research expenditures for the taxable
year over the base amount.90 With the alternative simplified credit, a
firm may elect to receive a credit equal to 14% of the qualified research
expenses “for the taxable year as exceeds 50 percent of the average
qualified research expenses for the 3 taxable years preceding the
taxable year for which the credit is being determined.”91 The basic
research credit, under IRC Section 41(e), allows companies that partner
with non-profit organizations to receive a credit equal to 20% for
qualified research above the qualified organizational base period
85

Guenther, supra note 76, at 11.
Id.
87
Id. at 13.
88
See Kevin Brady, Section-by-Section Summary of the Proposed “Protecting Americans
from Tax Hikes Act of 2015,” COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 3 (2015),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/SECTION-BY-SECTIONSUMMARY-OF-THE-PROPOSED-PATH-ACT.pdf.
89
Guenther, supra note 76, at 3.
90
26 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1) (2012); Guenther, supra note 76, at 13.
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26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(5).
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amount.92 Lastly, the energy research credit provides firms with a tax
credit that equals “20 percent of the amounts paid or incurred by the
taxpayer in carrying on any trade or business of the taxpayer during the
taxable year (including as contributions) to an energy research
consortium for energy research.”93
The regular research credit and the alternative simplified
credit rely on calculations using qualified research expenses and a base
amount.94 Qualified research expenses refer to the sum of in-house
research expenses or contract research expenses that are paid or
incurred by a firm during the taxable year.95 In-house expenses include
wages and supply costs.96 Contract research expenses refer to 65% of
the amount paid to another for qualified research.97 The base amount is
calculated from the product of the fixed-base percentage and the
average gross receipts of the taxpayer for the four taxable years prior to
the credit year.98
c.

Efficacy of the U.S. R&D Tax Credit

Much like the U.K. patent box,99 the effectiveness of the U.S.
R&D credit remains unclear.100 “In theory, the credit stimulates
increased investment in qualified research by lowering the after-tax
cost of undertaking another dollar of research.”101 Economic studies
have attempted to measure the efficacy of the R&D tax credit using
cost-benefit or R&D price elasticity analyses.102 This cost-benefit
method compares the increase in R&D spending to the loss in tax
revenue, while the price elasticity method “measures the percent
change in R&D in response to a 1% change in the user cost of
R&D.”103 A review of such studies found that there was a “dollar-fordollar increase in reported R&D spending on the margin” as a result of
92

Guenther, supra note 76, at 8.
26 U.S.C. § 41(a)(3) (2012).
Id. at § 41.
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Id. at § 41(b).
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Id. at § 41(b)(3).
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Id. at § 41(c).
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See supra Part II.B.1.iii.
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Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 355.
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Guenther, supra note 76, at 8.
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Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 355.
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Id. at 356.
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the R&D tax credit from 1980 to 1991.104 A study specific to the
pharmaceutical industry from 1982 to 1985, however, found the credit
to be much less beneficial, calling into question the reliability of such
analyses.105 Even in more recent studies, the efficacy of the R&D tax
credit remains debated.106
III.

AN INNOVATION POLICY MIX

Policy makers and scholars increasingly tout the use of a
policy mix to address the intricacies affecting a nation’s ability to
stimulate innovation.107 Although the scope of the term itself is subject
to debate,108 a policy mix109 can be understood as the combination of
and interaction between the domain areas covered, the rationales
proposed, the strategic tasks pursued, and the policy instruments
deployed to address a country’s innovation goals.110 The policy mix
approach accounts for the interdependence of actors, ideas, structures,
institutions, and policies that contribute to a nation’s innovation
performance and provides a tool for assessing the effectiveness of the
entirety of a nation’s innovation policies and the interactions thereof.111
“Using the policy mix concept . . . helps draw attention to
inconsistencies and redundancies” that may arise from the incremental
deployment of policy instruments.112 If it does not consider the entire
104

See BRONWYN H. HALL, EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION TAX
CREDITS: CRTITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN (1995),
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH95%20OTArtax.pdf.
105
Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 356.
106
See Guenther, supra note 76, at 8.
107
Kieron Flanagan, Elvira Uyarra, & Manuel Laranja, Reconceptualising the ‘policy
mix’ for Innovation, RESEARCH POLICY, Vol. 40 702–13 (2011); OECD, OECD Science,
Technology and Industry Outlook, OECD PUBLISHING 254 (2010),
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/science-and-technology/oecdscience-technology-and-industry-outlook-2010_sti_outlook-2010-en#page265.
108
Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, supra note 107, at 4–5; OECD, supra note 107, at 254.
109
The policy mix concept originated in the 1960s in the context of monetary and fiscal
policy and has since migrated to other policy arenas, including innovation. Flanagan,
Uyarra, & Laranja, supra note 107, at 3.
110
OECD, supra note 107, at 257. This understanding can be debated; however, in this
paper, this use is preferred.
111
Id. at 255–56; see also Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/outlook/eoutlook/stipolicyprofiles/competencestoinnovate/innovationpolicymixforbusinessrdandin
novation.htm (last visited May 14, 2016).
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innovation ecology assessed by the policy mix, a nation, though
interested in stimulating domestic innovation, might implement policy
instruments that focus too heavily on too small of an area, minimizing
its potential returns.113 Developing this framework will inform the
patent box efficacy analysis.
A. Domain Areas
All of innovation policies can be bifurcated into domain areas:
framework condition policies and dedicated science, technology, and
innovation policies.114 The complementary nature, or lack thereof, of
these domain areas may augment or reduce intended policy effects.115
Accordingly, a considered approach addressing the interaction of these
policies can “promote positive feedback responses in the tightlycoupled parts of the economy, or at least . . . mitigate the force of
negative feedbacks that can damp, or effectively counteract, the
intended effects of the policy intervention targets.”116
Framework condition policies affect the broad economic
factors relating to innovation and may not relate solely to innovation
goals.117 Exemplary economic factors include, among others,
macroeconomic policy, tax policy, labor market policy, competition
policy, education and training, infrastructure, and intellectual property
rights.118 Although these policies may not be innovation-specific, they
can be foundational.119 For example, a strong education system will
113

See id.
See OECD, supra note 107, at, 259.
See id. at 260–61.
116
PHILIPPE AGHION, PAUL A. DAVID & DOMINQUE FORAY, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
INNOVATION FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH: TOWARDS LINKING POLICY RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE IN ‘STIG SYSTEMS’ 22 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research Discussion
Paper No. 06-39, Oct. 2008), http://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/0639_0.pdf.
117
OECD, supra note 107, at 260.
118
OECD, supra note 107, at 260–62; OECD, INTELLIGENT DEMAND: POLICY
RATIONALE, DESIGN AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS 54–57 (OECD Sci, Tech and Industry
Policy Papers No. 13, 2014), http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5jz8p4rk3944.pdf?expires=1462395748&id=id&accnam
e=guest&checksum=A0747E344EF9D325F9BD0AF914380578 [hereinafter
INTELLIGENT DEMAND].
119
See OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF INNOVATION POLICY: CHINA 395 (2008),
http://climatesolver.org/sites/default/files/pdf/0809.pdf (“It is widely acknowledged that
innovative capacity is determined not only by a country’s research and development
(R&D) system but also by the interplay of factors which enable knowledge to be
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provide the highly-skilled workforce necessary to drive innovation.120
In another example, a stable macroeconomic environment may relieve
some of a firm’s more immediate concerns and allow it to invest in
long-term R&D projects.121 “There is a strong link between innovation
performance and innovation framework conditions.”122 “Supportive
framework conditions enable and facilitate innovation throughout the
economy” and have recently become more of a focal point for fostering
innovation.123
Dedicated science, technology, and innovation policies, by
contrast, target specific market, system, or even framework condition
policy failures relating to innovation.124 These policies incorporate both
supply- and demand-side measures—for example, R&D tax incentives
schemes or grants, and procurement policies, respectively—to support
direct investment in science, technology, and innovation, to enhance
the innovation competencies of firms, or to strengthen linkages within
innovation systems.125 Both the U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D tax
credit are examples of dedicated science, technology, and innovation
polices, as each focused on correcting specific market failures.126
B. Rationales
The fundamental rationales justifying policy intervention
address market failure, systems failure, or societal missions and
challenges.127

converted into new products, processes and organisational forms which in turn enhance
economic development and growth.”).
120
OECD, supra note 107, at 261.
121
Id.
122
INSIDE CONSULTING, BENCHMARKING INNOVATION POLICY AND INNOVATION
FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS 2 (Jan. 2004),
http://www.oecd.org/site/worldforum/33705586.pdf.
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OECD, supra note 107, at 260.
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Id. at 260, 262.
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Id. at 260, 268.
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See supra Section II.
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Market Failure

Market failure describes both the inability of price-market
institutions to facilitate desirable activities or to halt undesirable ones
and the inefficient allocation of resources.128 These failures stem from
indivisibilities, uncertainties, and externalities in the market
economy.129 Innovation market failures, in particular, primarily
manifest in three ways:
i) R&D activity often incurs high fixed costs and
economies of scale, while learning-by-doing gives
rise to dynamic economies of scale; ii) investment in
R&D is inherently risky and information
asymmetries abound in markets for knowledge and
technology, where they exist; and iii) because
knowledge has properties of a public good as
performers of R&D can only imperfectly appropriate
the results of their effort and the use of knowledge
does not preclude its simultaneous use by others.130
Underinvestment in R&D in the face of market failure has long been
the principle reason for policy intervention.131 These failures, it is
argued, prevent investment in innovation at the socially optimal
level.132 The U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D credit were predicated on
addressing market failures.133

128

Frances M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 3 (1958),
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/papers/b/Bator-market-failure.pdf; CLIFFORD
WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS
POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2 (2006),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2006/9/monetarypolicywinston/20061003.pdf; see also ELLEN SEWELL, MARKET FAILURE 26,
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129
Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 609 (1962), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf; INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra
note 118, at 8.
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INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 8 (emphasis in original).
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Id.; OECD, supra note 107, at 262.
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System Failure

System failures describe the barriers to innovation that arise
from inertia in the economy and hinder the production, distribution, and
adoption of knowledge.134 Innovation often requires cooperation or the
exchange of ideas to generate knowledge.135 System failures are
framework conditions—such as network effects, slow technological
transitions, slow-changing norms and values, and lack of
infrastructure136—that inhibit these necessary interactions.137 “System
failures block the functioning of the innovation system, hinder the flow
of knowledge and technology and, as a result, reduce the overall
efficiency of the system-wide R&D and innovation effort.”138
Overcoming these failures, however, necessitates building up
capability, intermediation, training, and cooperative programs.139
3.

Societal Missions and Costs

Societal missions and challenges direct the focus of
technology development in order to satisfy certain societal needs: “[I]t
is a primary duty of politics to provide direction for technological
development and innovation in order to satisfy state needs (e.g.
defence, security) and citizen needs (health, education).”140 These
measures incentivize actors to invest or pool resources to achieve a
predetermined goal.141
C. Strategic Tasks
Strategic tasks are the objectives addressed by policy
instruments.142 Complementary strategic tasks provide an optimal

134

OECD, supra note 107, at 263; INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 9.
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137
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140
Id.
141
Id.
142
OECD, supra note 107, at 264–65.
135
136

[7:249 2016] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

268

arrangement of policy instruments for supporting innovation.143 These
objectives include educating a potential workforce, ensuring proper
development and use of knowledge, providing supportive
infrastructures, enhancing public research contributions, and unleashing
the potential of firms.144 In the case of the U.K. patent box, one
strategic task, among others, was to increase patent related
commercialization.145 The U.S. R&D tax credit, by contrast, sought to
incentivize firms to invest in R&D.146
D. Instruments
Policy instruments are the regulatory tools used to achieve
particular strategic tasks and can be divided into five different
binaries.147
1.

Population vs. Non-Population Specific

This distinction characterizes who is the focus of the policy
intervention.148 Population-targeted instruments focus on the type of
firm or sector to be supported, whereas non-population targeted
instruments will apply broadly.149 Population-targeted instruments may
be directed toward facilitating innovation in small and medium-sized
enterprises (“SMEs”).150 The U.K., for instance, has implemented
several policy measures focused on SMEs.151 In non-populationtargeted instruments, policy intervention may affect firms of all types.

143
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Both the U.K. patent box and the U.S. R&D tax credit exemplify nonpopulation-targeted instruments, as each applies broadly.152
2.

Technology vs. Non-Technology Targeted

Technology-targeted policy instruments focus on developing
specific technologies, whereas non-technology-targeted instruments
apply broadly.153 For example, a nation may have an interest in
developing its biotechnology sector and intervene accordingly.154
Policy instruments may instead encourage all technologies. The U.K.
patent box and U.S. R&D tax credit typify the latter, as neither focuses
on incentivizing one particular technology.155
3.

Competitive vs. Non-competitive

Competitive policy instruments confer a benefit once certain
performance threshold criteria have been met.156 Non-competitive
instruments, on the other hand, apply universally or after a selection
process based on eligibility requirements.157 Recently, countries have
moved toward more competitive instruments for public sector research
institutions.158 The U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D tax, however,
exemplify non-competitive policy instruments, as applicants can simply
elect to apply these measures to eligible income or expenditures.159
4.

Financial vs. Non-financial

Policy instruments can be financial or non-financial in
nature.160 Financial instruments can be further divided into direct and
indirect instruments.161 Direct financial instruments include loans,
grants and innovation vouchers, while tax incentives are an example of

152
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an indirect financial instrument.162 Accordingly, the U.K. patent box
and the U.S. R&D tax credit are both examples of indirect financial
policy instruments.163 Non-financial instruments include information
campaigns or providing services.164 More often than not, nations deploy
financial instruments.165
5.

Supply-side vs. Demand-side

Lastly, “[p]olicy instruments to accelerate innovation have
been described as either technology (supply) push or demand (market)
pull.”166 Supply-side instruments foster knowledge production in order
to accelerate knowledge spillovers and externalities.167 Providing tax
incentives to encourage R&D spending is one example of a supply-side
measure.168 Both the U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D tax credit
exemplify supply-side measures. In contrast, demand-side instruments
foster market opportunities for innovation and encourage suppliers to
meet consumer innovation needs.169 Public procurement is one example
of demand-side measure.170 Although innovation policy has
traditionally favored supply-side instruments, interest in demand-side
instruments has grown in recent years.171
IV.

CONSTRUING THE PATENT BOX IN VIEW OF THE POLICY MIX

A policy prescription based solely on a comparison of
pertinent regulatory measures and the effects thereof would necessarily
ignore numerous dissimilarities and empirical uncertainties.172 The
U.K., or any country for that matter, has a unique set of actors, ideas,
structures, institutions, and policies that shape its innovation
performance.173 No single policy instrument is implemented in a
162
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vacuum. Proclaiming the efficacy of a patent box based on the number
of participating companies or the patents filed in the U.K. alone likely
neglects other important factors at play. To the extent this can be
overcome, a policy mix approach provides a means for normalization
and contextualization in performing such a comparison.174 In other
words, there is something to be gained from comparing the U.K.’s
adoption of the patent box in the context of the policy mix and from the
policy mix approach per se.
A. Redundancy
A patent box provides a similar yet less effective incentive
scheme compared to the already deployed R&D tax credit. Applying
the policy mix reveals that both the patent box and the R&D tax credit
are substantially similar policy instruments.175 Both, as dedicated
science, technology, and innovation policies,176 target specific market
failures rather than framework conditions.177 In particular, the patent
box pushes companies to commercialize patent-related products,178
while the U.S. R&D tax credit incentivizes companies to invest in
R&D.179 In terms of the binaries, each is broadly applicable and
without significant thresholds, and thus non-population targeted, nontechnology specific, and non-competitive.180 Each provides firms with
a tax credit, characteristic of an indirect financial instrument.181 Lastly,
both measures seek to foster the production of innovation rather than
the market demand for it, making them supply-side instruments.182
Nevertheless, instruments sharing these attributes do not
necessarily share effectiveness. An important distinction can be made
regarding where a given policy instrument acts within the innovation
development cycle.183 Here, the R&D tax credit applies when a firm
incurs expenses (a front-end incentive),184 whereas the patent box
174
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applies upon earning qualified income (a back end incentive).185
Regarding these particular instruments, it is likely more beneficial to
subsidize front-end activity than it is to subsidize back-end activity.186
“Rather than incentivizing private investment in technologies that are
under-explored (those with large and hard-to-capture benefits), a patent
box incentivizes firms to invest in new technologies that return the
largest private profits with the fewest externalities.”187 Put differently,
patent boxes may encourage profit at the expense of innovation.
Additional difficulties in defining what income is sufficiently related to
a patent in order to qualify may further tip the scales.188
Patent box proponents argue that the policies in tandem might
provide synergistic returns outweighing the social cost.189 Based on the
understanding of the UK’s innovation landscape provided by the policy
mix, however, nothing suggests that this would be the case.190 The U.K.
has implemented both policies, and nothing yet suggests such a
benefit.191 This may be made more compelling by the fact that there is a
commercialization market failure in the U.K. that is not present,
comparatively, in the US.192 If one was to expect a combined effect
from adding a patent box, it seems like it might occur in the instance
where the patent box, by its nature, addresses the specific market
failure of that country. All told, using these supply-side measures in
conjunction would be granting similar tax breaks to firms without a
clear social benefit in doing so.
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B. Remedying Market and System Failures
It is also uncertain to what extent the patent box resolves the
failures it purportedly addresses.193 One reason the U.K. implemented
the patent box was to provide incentives for companies to retain and
commercialize existing patents and to develop new patented
products.194 In this regard, “[t]he data paint[s] a somewhat unclear
picture as to whether or not patent boxes are serving their intended
purpose to ‘attract R&D and increase commercialization of innovation
from domestic firms.’”195 Beyond mere anecdotes,196 the adoption of
the U.K. patent box has done little so far to discharge this
uncertainty.197 For at least this reason, it seems prudent to wait until
more data provides clarity on how well it overcomes this market failure
and whether it is worth implementation in the U.S.
Another reason proffered for deploying the patent box was to
prevent tax base shifting, a system failure, and instead incentivize firms
to relocate manufacturing operations to the adopting country.198 A
recent study, however, has confirmed that patent boxes generate
“significant effect on patent location without a change in real research
activity, aiming only at the tax benefits.”199 In other words, firms are
moving holdings to patent box countries while maintaining operations
elsewhere. The recent OECD recommendations suggest that this may
be the case with the current U.K. patent box.200 It is possible that these
recommendations will resolve certain issues, but only time will tell if
these changes will result in the relocation of manufacturing. Again, it
193
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seems sensible to see how well the UK’s new patent box produces the
intended results before acting.
C. Recommendations
Expending political capital to enact a patent box as a cure-all
for the U.S.’s innovation and tax woes would likely miss the mark.
Instead, the U.S., once a leader in innovation policy,201 might well
benefit from the measured and holistic approach provided by the policy
mix model. Rather than simply following suit as other countries enact
patent boxes, the U.S. could deploy any number of coherent and
synergistic policy instruments to better foster innovation. For example,
the U.S. could address certain framework conditions or perhaps target
instruments to aid the innovation of SMEs.202 Looking into demandside policies may also provide a worthy compliment to the R&D tax
credit, as studies have shown a clear interaction between such
policies.203 Technology-targeted policy instruments might also help by
providing resources to underfunded technology spaces.204
Additionally, an ever-present undercurrent to patent box
discussions seems to be corporate tax regulation as a whole.205 Some
even see these proposals as a platform to address corporate tax
reform.206 While tax policy is one of the framework conditions
affecting innovation,207 it may be better to address these issues head on
rather than attempting to solve with the patent box. “[P]roviding tax
benefits for patent box income, especially if broadly defined, will lose
revenues and make lowering overall corporate tax rates more difficult
to achieve in a revenue-neutral tax reform.”208
Lastly, measuring the efficacy of policy instruments can be
quite difficult.209 In engineering control theory, feedback loops are used
201
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to monitor dynamic systems.210 These feedback loops provide data for
further corrective or adaptive modification.211 This concept may have
value in forming policy instruments. Perhaps part of the policy
development process could focus on how an instrument’s effectiveness
might be evaluated in the future and ways in which pertinent data could
be collected. In that way, the true impact could be assessed for more
informed policymaking.
V.

CONCLUSION

Emerging Congressional support for a patent box has afforded
an opportunity to assess its potential use as an innovation policy tool.212
Evaluating the U.K.’s recent adoption of a patent box in light of
existing U.S. policy and within a policy mix framework has revealed
certain redundancy and efficacy concerns. Innovation in the U.S. might
be better served by adopting a policy mix approach, addressing certain
framework conditions critical to innovation, and implementing
additional policy tools to complement its R&D tax credit. Doing so
may ensure continued prosperity in an increasingly competitive and
innovation focused global economy.
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